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COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-REAPPORTIONMENTEFFECT OF ONE MAN, ONE VOTE PRINCIPLE
ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT
BELOW THE STATE LEGISLATIVE LEVEL*
I. ITRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

There has been much activity in the apportionment area since
the landmark case of Baker v. Carr' recognized that legislative
apportionment which allegedly deprived one of equal protection
of the law in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution presented a justiciable constitutional cause of
action over which the federal courts had jurisdiction. Soon after
Baker the courts were flooded with litigation contesting the
apportionment of the legislative bodies in numerous states.
However, Baker had done little more than establish the general
postulate that the fourteenth amendment prohibited "invidious
discrimination," 2 and it was not until the decision in Grey v.
Sanders3 that the genesis of the "one person, one vote" principle
emerged under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The Court articulated it as follows:
Once the geographical unit for which a representative is to
be chosen is designated, all who participate in the election
are to have an equal vote-whatever their race, whatever
their sex, whatever their occupation, whatever their income,
and wherever their home may be in that geographical unit.
This is required by the Equal Protection Clause of the
4
Fourteenth Amendment.
* Sailor v. Board of Educ., 87 S. Ct 1549 (1967) ; Dusch v. Davis, 87 S. Ct.

1554 (1967).
1. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2. See Sims v. Frink, 208 F. Supp. 431, 436 (M.D. Ala. 1962); Westberry
v. Vandiver, 206 F. Supp. 276, 282 (N.D. Ga. 1962).
3. 372 U.S. 368 (1963). The court held the Georgia county unit system unconstitutional for use in statewide primary elections. This device permitted
every qualified voter one vote; but it employed a system of tabulating the
results which ultimately accorded rural votes more weight than urban votes,
resulting in a dilution of the weight of the votes in some areas merely because
of the voter's residence. See also Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), dealing with apportionment of congressional districts and enunciating the principle
of equal representation for equal numbers of people.
4. Grey v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379 (1963).
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The court went on to proclaim that "[tihe conception of political
equality from the Declaration of Independence to Lincoln's
Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing-one person, one
vote."0r
Following Grey came Reynolds v. Simns and its companion
cases7 dealing with the apportionment of state legislatures.
Reynolds recognized the equal protection clause as requiring
both houses of a bicameral state legislature to be apportioned
substantially on a population basis. In Reynolds and its five
companion cases the Court enunciated various general standards
that the states must meet to satisfy the "one man, one vote" principle. The states must make an honest and good faith effort to
draw districts in both houses of the legislature as representative
of equal population as practicable.8 The resulting apportionment must be one based substantially on population, and the
equal population principle must not be diluted in any significant
way." However, there are neither uniform formulas nor rigid
mathematical criteria for evaluating the constitutionality of the
apportionment. Instead, the courts must determine if there has
been faithful adherence to a plan of population-based representation, allowing only those minor deviations which are free from
any taint of discrimination or arbitrariness. 10 Some variance is
permissible when intended to foster rational state policy, but
population must not be eclipsed as the controlling consideration
in the apportionment scheme." Furthermore, the equal representation principle may not be negated by the majority of the
voters of the state. If the scheme contravenes the dictates of the
equal protection clause, it will not be validated by majority
approval.' 2
As is readily apparent from the foregoing, the Court has laid
down a very flexible general principle which is adaptable to
varying circumstances. A recent Supreme Court apportionment
5. Id. at 381 (emphasis added).

6. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
7. WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964); Maryland Comm'n For
Fair Representation v. Towes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S.
678 (1964) ; Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964) ; Lucas v. Forty-Fourth
Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
8. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964).
9. Id. at 578.
10. Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 710 (1964).
11. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 581 (1964).
12. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 736 (1964).
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case conceived a somewhat more specific guide for the application of the Reynolds principle. After the reapportionment of
the Florida legislature there was still a considerable imbalance
among districts for which no justification was advanced. The
Court observed that
[die minimus deviations are unavoidable, but variations of
30% among senate districts and 40% among house districts
can hardly be deemed de minimus and none of our cases
suggests that differences of this magnitude will be approved
without a satisfactory explanation grounded on acceptable
state policy.' 3
Nevertheless, the Court has been content generally to allow the
lower courts to work out the specific standards for evaluating
state legislative apportionment schemes, concluding that the
doctrine can best be developed on a case-by-case basis in the
14
context of actual litigation.
I. STATE ANw)

FED AL APPICATioN OF

Reynolds To LOCAL

GOVERNMENTAL BODIES
Since apportionment of state legislative bodies in accordance
with the "one person, one vote" principle is now an established
requirement, there is much discussion as to what extent, if any,
these principles have application below the state level to local
governmental bodies. 15 The majority of the courts, both state
and federal, which have been confronted with the question have
reasoned that the equal protection clause applies equally on both
local and state legislative levels. Accordingly, the Reynolds
principle has been applied to a parish police jury,'( city councils, 1 7 county boards of supervisors,' 8 county commissioners,' 9
13. Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 444 (1967).

14. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 578 (1964).

15. See Weinstein, The Effect of the Federal Reapportionment Decisions on

Counties and Other Forms of Municipal Government, 65 COLum. L. Rv. 21
(1965); 44 NEB. L. REv. 850 (1965); 53 VA. L. REv. 953 (1967).
16. Simon v. Lafayette Parish Police Jury, 226 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. La.

1964).
17. Ellis v. Mayor and City Council, 352 F2d 123 (4th Cir. 1965); Seaman

v. Fedourich, 16 N.Y.2d 94, 209 N.E.2d 778, 262 N.Y.S2d 444 (1965).
18. Bianchi v. Griffing, 238 F. Supp. 997, appeal dismissed, 382 U.S. 15
(1965) ; Bianchi v. Griffing, 256 F. Supp. 617 (1966), remanded, 87 S. Ct. 1544

(1967) ; Dyer v. Rich, 259 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Miss. 1966) ; Brouwer v. Bronkema, 377 Mich. 616, 141 N.W.2d 98 (1966) ; Knudson v. Klevering, 377 Mich.
666, 141 N.W2d 120 (1966) ; Mauk v. Hoffman, 87 NJ. Super. 276, 209 A2d
150 (1965); Boldstein v. Rockefeller, 45 Misc. 2d 778, 257 N.Y.S.2d 994
(1965); State ex rel. Sonneborn v. Sylvester, 26 Wis. 2d 43, 132 N.W.2d
249 (1965).
19. Hanlon v. Towey, 274 Minn. 187, 142 N.W.2d 741 (1966); Bailey v.
Jones, 139 N.W.2d 385 (Sup. Ct. S.D. 1966).
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and school boards. 20 The lower courts have not been unanimous,
however, in their application of Reynolds to local bodies. 21 There
has been some reliance on the Court's earlier (pre-Reynolds)
dismissal of Tedesco v. Board of Supervisors of Election2 2 and,
more recently, Glass v. Hancock County Election Commission-

ers23 to support the contention that the Reynolds principle
should be limited to state legislatures.
As previously noted, the weight of authority has extended the
Reynolds principle to local governmental agencies. In adopting
this position the courts have often looked to the nature of the
governmental body to justify the extension. 4 While conceding
that many local positions could be made appointive by the
legislature, some courts have asserted that once the state under
its plenary power provides the right to vote, it must adhere to
the "one person, one vote" principle and must insure equal representation.25 Others have discussed the disparity between a
local government body of an administrative character and one
legislative in nature, requiring equal representation in the latter
while finding it unnecessary in the former. 26 Indeed, the majority of those courts which have extended "one man, one vote" to
local governmental bodies have acknowledged, either expressly
or impliedly, the administrative-legislative distinction and have
confined the application of Reynolds to elective bodies possessing
20. Strickland v. Burns, 256 F. Supp. 824 (M.D. Tenn. 1966); Delozier v.

Tyrone Area School Bd., 247 F. Supp. 30 (W.D. Pa. 1965).
21. See Moody v. Flowers, 256 F. Supp. 195 (M.D. Ala. 1966), remanded,
87 S. Ct. 1544 (1967); Johnson v. Genesee County, 232 F. Supp. 567 (E.D.
Mich. 1964).
22. 43 So.2d 514 (La. Ct. App. 1949), appeal dismissed, 339 U.S. 940 (1950).
In Tedesco there was a large disparity in the number of people represented by
home members of the city commissioners due to malapportioned election districts.
23. 250 Miss. 40, 156 So.2d 825 (1963), appeal dismissed, 378 U.S. 558 (1964).
In Glass there was a population disparity among county supervisor districts.
The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the refusal to grant injunctive relief
on the theory that there was an adequate statutory remedy at law for redistricting.
24. See generally Weinstein, The Effect of the Federal Reapportionment

Decisions on Counties and Other Forms of Municipal Government, 65 COLUm.

L. REv. 21 (1965).
25. Delozier v. Tyrone Area School Bd., 247 F. Supp. 30, 34-35 (W.D. Pa.
1965) ; Brouwer v. Bronkema, 377 Mich. 616, 141 N.W2d 98 (1966) ; Hanlon v.
Towey, 274 Minn. 187, 142 N.W.2d 741 (1966); Bailey v. Jones, 139 N.W.2d
385, 388 (Sup. Ct. S.D. 1966) ; State ex rel. Sonneborn v. Sylvester, 26 Wis. 2d
43, 132 N.W.2d 249 (1965).
26. Hanlon v. Towey, 274 Minn. 187, 142 N.W.2d 741, 747 (1966); State
ex rel. Sonnebom v. Sylvester, 26 Wis. 2d 43, 132 N.W.2d 249, 256 (1965).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol19/iss5/12

4

et al.: COMMENTS
COMENTS

1967]

some legislative powers.2
However, one three-judge federal
district court recently declined to recognize this distinction,
ruling that elected county school commissioners must be apportioned according to population, even though the local body
allegedly performed only administrative functions, so long as
28
its delegated powers were not insignificant or unimportant.
III.

REcENT TRENDS AND DEVELoPmENTS

The United States Supreme Court recently decided four cases
in the area of apportionment of local governmental bodies. In
none of these did it determine to just what extent Reynolds
would be applied at the local level. The Court remanded two of
these cases to the district court for want of jurisdiction and consequently did not reach the merits.29 The other two cases, Sailor
27. See Dyer v. Rich, 259 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Miss. 1966); Bianchi v. Griffing, 238 F. Supp. 997, 1004 (E.D.N.Y. 1965); Seaman v. Fedourich, 16 N.Y.2d
94, 209 N.E.2d 778, 782, 262 N.Y.S.2d 444, 449 (19-65) ; Mauk v. Hoffman, 87
N.J. Super. 276, 209 A.2d 150, 152 (1965) ; State ex rel. Sonneborn v. Sylvester,
26 Wis. 2d 43, 132 N.W.2d 249, 256 (1965). See also New Jersey State AFLCIO v. State Fed. Dist Bd. of Educ., 93 N.J. Super. 31, 40, 224 A2d 519, 524
(1966), where the court stated that
[t]hese decisions [Reynolds, Mauk, etc.] make it clear that a government which has the power to enact legislation directly affecting its constituents should be apportioned on a proportional basis. The concern of
the courts was not with organizations which do not represent the electorate as their chosen ruling body and which do not enact legislation
directly affecting their constituents.
28. Strickland v. Burns, 256 F. Supp. 824, 827 (M.D. Tenn. 1966). Judge
Miller's concurring opinion in Strickland expressly rejected the administrativelegislative distinction.
It is fruitless, in my view, to pursue the elusive distinction between legislative and administrative functions ....
So long as a subordinate body
is vested with significant and important powers of government whether
they be labeled legislative, or administrative, or both, I can see no reason
why it should be permissible under the equal protection clause for a state
arbitrarily to debase the value of one person's vote in favor of another.
Id. at 836 (concurring opinion). The dissent in Strickland, however, emphasized
the administrative-legislative distinction and concluded that Reynolds did not
apply to local elections to agencies possessing no legislative power: "Once the
Legislature is validly constituted, I do not believe there is a constitutional requirement that personnel of its subservient arms and agencies, created to perform purely administrative functions, must be elected on the 'one man, one vote'
basis." Id. at 837 (dissenting opinion).
29. Moody v. Flowers, 87 S. Ct. 1544 (1967). The lower court cases of
Moody v. Flowers, 256 F. Supp. 195 (M.D. Ala. 1966), and Bianchi v. Griffing,
256 F. Supp. 617 (E.D.N.Y. 1966), were combined for remand to their respective district courts because the three-judge district courts from which the
appeals came were improperly convened. The statute involved in each case was
not of statewide application; therefore, the litigation should have been heard
by a single-judge district court and appeal taken to the circuit court of appeals.
For this reason the Supreme Court held that it did not have jurisdiction and
remanded the cases to allow appeal to the circuit court of appeals.
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v. Board of Supervisors" and Dusch v. Davis,31 do shed some
light on the issue of local application of Reynolds, and they provide more food for speculation on the ultimate stand the Court
will take on the matter.
In Sailor the action was brought to declare the Board of
Education of Kent County unconstitutionally constituted. The
county board was a five-member body chosen by delegates from
the local school boards. The members of the local school boards
were elected by the school electors, and each local school board
sent one delegate to a biennial meeting where the delegates chose
the five-member county board. The delegates from the local
school boards each had one vote irrespective of the population
of the local school district. The Court held that no election was
required for members of the County Board of Education which
performed essentially administrative functions, that the system
by which the board members were chosen was basically appointive rather than elective and did not violate the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment, and that the principle of
"one man, one vote" had no relevancy to this situation.
Thus, the Court confirmed the significance of the administrative-legislative distinction forecast in the lower courts by
agreeing that there is no constitutional requirement that administrative bodies be elective. Indeed, at the outset the Court emphasized that the state has vast leeway in the management of its
internal affairs unless they run afoul of some federally protected
right. In addition, it recognized that the state is at liberty to
appoint state and local officers of a non-legislative character.
The Court then pointed out that "[tihe County Board of Education performs essentially administrative functions; and while
they are important, they are not legislative in the classical
sense."8 2 Having established that nonlegislative officers could be
appointed, the court concluded that there was no election being
contested, but rather the appointment of the county board members by the delegates was the contested matter. This being the
30. 87 S. Ct. 1549 (1967).
31. 87 S. Ct. 1554 (1967).
32. Sailor v. Board of Education, 87 S. Ct. 1549, 1553 (1967). The powers of
the board include appointment of a county school superintendent, preparation
of an annual budget and levy of taxes, distribution of delinquent taxes, furnishing consulting or supervisory service to a constituent school district, conducting
cooperative educational programs, employment of teachers for special educational programs, establishing, at the direction of the Board of Supervisors, a
school for children in juvenile homes and transfer of areas from one school district to another. Id. at 1553, n.7.
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case, the Court resolved that "one man, one vote" had no relevancy because no election was involved and none required. It
emphasized, however, that it was not deciding whether the Reynolds principle must be applied to the election of a local administrative official or agency where the election process had been
provided. Moreover, it refused to decide whether Reynolds
necessitates the apportionment of municipal or county legislative
agencies. Therefore, one finds that Sailor added little to the
basic consideration of Reynolds' application to local governmental bodies, because the facts of the case did not require such
application.
Unlike the situation in Sailor where the court concluded that
no election had been contested, there was an election procedure
challenged in Davis. This litigation arose after Virginia Beach,
Virginia, consolidated with adjoining Princess Anne County
and adopted a borough form of government. The boroughs
varied widely in population from 733 in the smallest to 29,048 in
the largest. The amended charter provided for a city council of
eleven members, four of whom were elected at large without
regard to residence. The remaining seven were elected by the
voters of the entire city, one being required to reside in each of
the seven boroughs. The Court upheld the residence requirement
in ruling that the seven-four plan did not constitute invidious
discrimination violative of the equal protection clause as it resulted in no distinction on the basis of race, creed, economic
status or location.
Justice Douglas, who was also the author of the Sailor opinion,
wrote a brief opinion rejecting the circuit court's holding that
the plan discriminated against some voters because of their place
of residence. The Court pointed out that all of the city's voters
elected the eleven councilmen and although a councilman was
required to reside in each of the seven boroughs, he was responsive to the will of the entire population of the city. Thus, he
was not a representative of the borough but was a representative
of the entire city. In sustaining the residence requirement the
Court cited the recent case of Fortson v. Dorsey3 which upheld
a similar requirement for the election of state senators from a
multi-district county by pointing out that each senator was a
representative of the entire county and not just the district in
which he resided. In Dusek the residence requirement was
33. 379 U.S. 433, 438 (1965).
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viewed as failing to represent invidious discrimination fatal to
the apportionment scheme; it was part and parcel of an honest
effort to represent the varied and conflicting interests within
the vast urban-rural complex by.placing persons on the council
with knowledge of the various areas within the city.
It is interesting to note that in Dusoh the Court assumed
arguendo that Reynolds will govern the apportionment of local
legislative agencies and then proceeded to reverse the circuit
court of appeals ruling that the Reynolds standard applied to
the city council and had been violated. In doing so, however,
the Court pointed out that the Reynolds test of invidious discrimination had not been violated, assuming arguendo that it
governed the situation. Therefore, Dusek does not answer finally
the question of whether Reynolds governs the apportionment of
local elective bodies. In Sailor the Court made the arguendo
assumption that where the state provides for an election of a
local official or agency, the requirements of Reynolds must be
met, but it reserved the question for a later case. Because of the
facts in Dusci, the Court was not compelled to determine
whether Reynolds applied on the local level; however, the
arguendo assumptions in both Sailor and Dusol give strong
indications of the leanings of the Court.
IV. CoNOL.UsION
A review of the pertinent lower court decisions, the general
language of Reynolds itself, and the implications one can derive
from Sailor and Dusoh seem to indicate that when a. case with
the appropriate set of facts reaches the Court, the Reynolds
principle will be extended in application to include local elective
officials or agencies of a legislative nature. Moreover, there is
strong argunent for the application of Reynolds to local administrative officials or agencies once the elective process is provided. Just where the line will be drawn remains a matter of
sheer speculation; but it seems possible, perhaps even probable,
that the "one man, one vote" principle will become an integral
part of the elective process at the local level just as it has at the
state level.
W =Ax L. BnTHA, JR.
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-FOURTH
AMENDMENT-REJECTION OF MERE EVIDENCE
RULE IN SEARCH AND SEIZURE CASES-11
The United States Supreme Court has finally rejected the
distinction recognized in many earlier cases between seizure of
items of evidential value only and seizure of instruments, fruits,
and contraband. Even in an era of increased protection of the
individual's constitutional rights, the mere evidence rule has
been constantly criticized as an irrational impediment to law
enforcement. Its demise will undoubtedly be greeted enthusiastically by police officials.
In Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden,' a Maryland
court convicted the respondent of armed robbery. He had been
arrested in his home minutes after the robbery of a taxicab company office. The robber was followed to the house and was
observed being admitted by the respondent's wife. Hayden was
found in an upstairs bedroom feigning sleep and was arrested
when a search of the house disclosed no other man. Among the
items seized by the police were a jacket and a pair of trousers
which matched the description of the clothing worn by the robber. The jacket and trousers were admitted in evidence at the
trial without objection. The respondent was convicted and sentenced to prison. After unsuccessful state court proceedings, he
sought and was denied federal habeas corpus relief in the Maryland district court. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the items had evidential value only and, therefore, were not lawfully subject to seizure.2 The United States Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the
mere evidence distinction as based on premises no longer accepted
as rules governing the application of the fourth amendment. 3
The fourth amendment was a reaction to the use of the general
warrant in England and the writs of assistance in the Colonies
and was intended to protect against invasions of "the sanctity of
a man's home and the privacies of life."'4 Protection of these
interests was assured by prohibiting all "unreasonable" searches
Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 87 S. Ct. 1642 (1967).

1. 87 S. Ct. 1642 (1967).
2. Hayden v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 363 F2d 647 (4th Cir. 1966).
3. Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 87 S. Ct. 1642 (1967).
4. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).

847
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and seizures and by requiring the use of warrants, thereby interposing "a magistrate between the citizen and the police." 5
There is nothing in the language of the fourth amendment to
support the distinction between "mere evidence" and instrumentalities, fruits of crime or contraband. The people are guaranteed the right to be secure in their persons, houses and effects
without regard to the use to which any of these things is applied.
This constitutional right is certainly unrelated to the mere evidence limitation. A purely evidentiary search disturbs one's
privacy no more than a search intended to uncover an instrumentality, a fruit, or contraband. A magistrate can intervene in
both situations, and the requirements of probable cause and
specificity can be preserved intact. In addition, nothing in the
nature of the property seized as evidence renders it more private
than property seized, for example, as an instrumentality. Depending on the circumstances, the same article might be mere
evidence in one case and be considered an instrumentality in
another.
The asserted rule that mere evidence cannot be seized under a
warrant or incident to an arrest has been generally condemned
as unsound by modern writers. It is typically described as "un-7
fortunate" and is an often-cited example of a legal absurdity.
No satisfactory rationale for this doctrine has ever been articulated; it creates a totally arbitrary impediment to law enforcement without protecting any important interest of the individual.
A defendant has a constitutional right to be free from any unreasonable searches and seizures by law enforcement officials.
However, when the search itself is reasonable, it becomes impossible to understand why the admissibility of seized items should
depend on whether they are merely evidentiary or evidentiary
plus something else.
Stolen property-the fruits of crime-has always been subject
to seizure. The power to search for stolen property was gradually
extended to cover any property which the private citizen was not
permitted to possess, including instrumentalities of crime and
contraband. 8 No separate governmental interest in evidence used
merely to apprehend and convict criminals was recognized; it
was essential that some property interest be asserted. The mere
5. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948).
6. 8 J. WIGoRn, EVIDExNCE 45 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
7. Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A No Man's Land in the Criminal Law, 49

L. Pxv.474, 478 (1961).
8. Id. at 475.

CAL.
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evidence rule seems to have its foundation in these property concepts." The modern view, however, is that the exclusionary rules
of evidence exist primarily to protect personal rights rather than
property interests and that common law property concepts are
usually irrelevant. 10 It seems rather anachronistic to determine
the admissibility of evidence on the basis of the sovereign's right
at common law to replevy the items.
Although property concepts may have engendered the rule,
some of the opinions imply that its major purpose is to prevent
exploratory searches." If that is the rule's purpose, it is not its
effect. The mere evidence rule does not prevent exploratory
searches at all; it prevents the seizure of mere evidence in the
course of any search, reasonable or unreasonable, specific or general. It has also been suggested that the rule protects privacy by
preserving a man's most private papers from seizure, however
reasonable it might be. 12 The difficulty with this rationale is
that the rule protects, not all private papers, but only those which
constitute mere evidence. 13 Private papers which are also the
instruments of crime may be seized. 14
Finally, it is impossible to sustain the mere evidence rule as a
corollary to the privilege against self-incrimination. It is not
limited to self-incriminating writings; and when such writings
are obtained by seizure instead of by subpoena, their genuineness
is not impliedly admitted. Moreover, the papers are no less selfincriminating when they can be classified as contraband, instruments, or fruits. However, the possibility of mere evidence being
violative of the fifth amendment may represent the largest loophole in the court's rejection of the mere evidence distinction in
15
Hayden.
The greatest stumbling block to rejection of the mere evidence
rule has been the contention that Gouled v. United States'(
9. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921).
10. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.257, 266 (1932).

11. See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. United States, 285 U.S. 452, 465 (1932).
12. 20 U. CHi. L. REv. 319, 327 (1953).
13. "There is no special sanction in papers, as distinguished from forms of
property, to render them immune from search and seizure, if only they fall within the scope of the principles of the cases in which other property may be
seized." Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921).
14. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 238 (1960).
15. "This case thus does not require that we consider whether there are items
of evidential value whose very nature precludes them from being the object of a
reasonable search and seizure." Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 87 S.Ct.
1642, 1648 (1967).

16. 255 U.S.298 (1921).
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adopted the rule as a constitutional standard. Although the Court
in GouZed purported to rest its holding on the fourth and fifth
amendments, it did not rely on any specific constitutional language.17 Ker v. California"' has since recognized that the purpose of the distinction between constitutional and supervisory
rules is to separate fundamental civil liberties, which the states
must respect, from federal procedural rules, which the states
may ignore. Opinions written before this distinction assumed its
present crucial importance may have to be reinterpreted in the
light of "the demands of our federal system." 19
Gouled v. United States2 0 is especially ripe for reinterpretation, because its adoption of the mere evidence rule as a constitutional standard was not necessary to the result in the case. The
validity of a warrant authorizing the seizure of materials stipulated to be merely evidentiary was challenged. The federal statute under which the warrant was issued authorized seizure only
when the property was "stolen or embezzled" or "used as the
means of committing a felony." 21 Instead of basing its decision
on the statute the court concluded that the search and seizure
violated the fourth and fifth amendments. Perhaps it meant no
more than that the seizure was unconstitutional because seizures
that exceed statutory authority are always unreasonable.
The Supreme Court has not treated the Gouled rule as a fundamental constitutional standard. The rule has been distinguished
nearly out of existence by the instrumentality exception. Gouzed
recognized that instruments used in the commission of crime may
be seized because of the public's interest in preventing their use
in subsequent crimes.22 This policy furnishes no justification for
the use of the instrument as evidence if such use would otherwise
violate the fourth and fifth amendments. It is not necessary to
use the instrument as evidence in order to prevent its use in
future crimes. Sending the owner to prison may prevent future
crimes, but this consideration applies to mere evidence as well as
instrumentalities and is equally applicable to fruits and contra-

band. Nor is it clear how in some situations one can determine
whether or not an item is the instrument or fruit or evidence of
a crime until the owner's guilt or innocence is determined at the
trial.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
374 U.S. 23 (1963).
Id. at 33.
255 U.S. 298 (1921).
Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, § 11, 40 Stat. 228.
Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921).
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The first Supreme Court case to interpret the Gouled rule was
also the first to invoke the instrumentality exception to restrict
it. In Marron v. United States2 3 federal officers lawfully entered
a saloon and observed illegal sales of liquor. They then arrested
the employees and patrons and seized a business ledger and some
utility bills. The seizure was held reasonable as incident to an
arrest, and the items were admitted into evidence. The Court
circumvented the mere evidence rule in holding that the bills and
accounts were convenient if not necessary to conducting an illegal
liquor business and were therefore seizable instrumentalities of
the crime. 24 It was not suggested that seizing the items would
prevent future crimes other than by enabling the government to
obtain convictions.
In United States v. Lefkowitz 2 5r, as in Marron, federal officers
raided an illegal liquor establishment and seized business records
and utility bills. The difference here was that the officers did
not confine themselves to seizing items in plain view, but
thoroughly searched wastebaskets, cabinets and drawers. The
evidence was suppressed by the Court because the search was too
broad and because the items seized were mere evidence.26 Consider, however, the manner in which the Court distinguished
Marron. In Marron, the Court concluded that the search was
27
reasonable and that the items were instruments of the crime.
Since the articles seized and the offense charged were almost
precisely the same in both cases, the distinction between the two
was to be found only in the scope of the search. When the search
was so broad as to be exploratory in nature, the mere evidence
rule was resorted to as an alternative-and, of course, superfluous-ground for exclusion. When the search was otherwise
reasonable, the same items became instruments of crime.
Marron and Lefkowitz set the pattern for future treatment of
the mere evidence rule by the Supreme Court. Although the rule
was never expressly repudiated, neither was any evidence ever
suppressed in reliance on it standing alone. In virtually every
case the legality of a search incident to arrest was the major
issue.2

8

23. 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
24. Id. at 199.

25. 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
26. Id. at 464.

27. Id. at 465.
28. See, e.g., Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946), where the disputed
issue was whether incriminating evidence (a check) could be seized in the

course of a search to which the defendant had consented by contract. The court
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The Court in Hayden agreed that the survival of the GouZed
distinction is "attributable more to chance than considered judgment" ;20 it was equally critical of the rule's claim to constituionality. "Gouled concluded, needlessly it appears, that the
Constitution virtually limited searches and seizures to these categories."3 0 Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, noted
that Mapp v. Ohio 3 1 had only recently made the mere evidence
rule a problem in the state courts, 32 and that pressure against the
rule in the federal courts had "taken the form rather of broadening the categories of evidence subject to seizure, thereby creating
considerable confusion in the law." 33
The Court also interpreted Schmerber v. Callfornias4 as having settled the proposition that it is reasonable, within the fourth
amendment, to conduct "otherwise permissible searches for the
purpose of obtaining evidence which would aid in apprehending
and convicting criminals,"3 5 an observation which might startle
some students of that well known decision. Mir. Justice Brennan
made it clear that the Hayden decision would not serve as a
license for exploratory searches. A nexus must be found between
the item to be seized and criminal behavior.3 6 Therefore, in the
case of mere evidence, "probable cause must be examined in
terms of cause to believe that the evidence sought will aid in a
particular apprehension or conviction. In so doing, consideration
37
of police purposes will be required."
The court had no difficulty in locating the required nexus in
the instant case; the clothes which were seized matched the
description of those worn by the robber, and "the police therefore
could reasonably believe that the items would aid in the identification of the culprit. '38
The Gouled mere evidence rule has been cited often but is generally no longer applied. Its claim to constitutional standing
rested on a single case in which it was not necessary to decide
held that, since the search was lawful, the agents could have copied the check

and used the copy as evidence; therefore no purpose would be served in excluding the check as being violative of the mere evidence rule.
29. Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 87 S. Ct. 1642, 1650 (1967).
30. Id. at 1651.
31. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
32. Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 87 S. Ct. 1642, 1651 (1967).
33. Id.
34. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
35. Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 1650 (1967).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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853

any constitutional issues. It has been distinguished in subsequent
opinions, almost to the point of extinction, by technical exceptions which have usually omitted policy considerations. It has
been a favorite target of writers. No clear constitutional basis
can be found for it. Its rejection must be welcomed. It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court waited so long to cast aside such
an arbitrary impediment to law enforcement.
THOMAS EuGENE
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CORPORATIONS-FULL DISCLOSURE-BREACH
OF FIDUCIARY DUTY OWED BY OFFICER
AND/OR DIRECTOR TO MINORITY
STOCKHOLDERS*
I. INTRODUCTION

While there is much to be said for the postulate that morality
and ethics cannot be legislated, effective steps can be taken to
deter individuals from deviating from desired standards of conduct. Self-imposed restrictions combined with an adherence to
basic concepts of ethics and "fair play" would reduce if not eliminate conflicts of interest arising from certain business transactions. However, such a Utopian ideal, no matter how desirable,
commands little attention in the pragmatists' environment of the
2
business world of today.' As proposed by William L. Cary,
[D]isclosure is the most realistic means of coping with the
Disclosure
ever-present problem of conflicts of interest ....
is the foundation of reliance on self-regulatory approaches
to conflict problems and is the clearest alternative to greater
governmental or institutional intervention.... [T]he purpose
of forbidding undisclosed interests is to eliminate inducejudgment,
ments to wrongdoing and promote freedom of
3
rather than provide for restitution of damages.
II. Tmi PROBrxm
The issue in Jaxobson v. Yaschik 4 was whether, under the circumstances, the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty to disclose
to her such facts as might affect the value of her stock.
* Jacobson v. Yaschik, 155 S.E.2d 601 (S.C. 1967).

1. Baumhart, How Ethical Are Businessmen, 39 HARV. Bus. RFV. 6, 7
(July-Aug. 1961). In a poll conducted by the Harvard Bwiness Review businessmen were asked the following type of question: If you were a board member in possession of certain information which when made public would appreciate the value of your company's stock, would you purchase shares of stock of
the company? The response was that over forty-two per cent answered affirmatively. In reply to another question quizzing the businessman as to how he
thought the average businessman would react in such a situation, sixty-one per
cent felt that the average executive would take advantage of the situation and
would purchase the stock. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp.
262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
2. Chairman of the SEC since June 5, 1961.
3. Cary, Corporate Standards and Legal Rides, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 408, 409
(1962) (emphasis added).
4. 155 S.E.2d 601 (1967).
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The plaintiff, Jacobson, was the owner of twenty-five percent
-fifty shares--of the capital stock in Syndicate, Inc. which held
an eighty-two acre tract of land as its only asset. The defendant,
Yaschik, was president, general manager and majority stockholder in the corporation. He owned seventy-five percent-150
shares-of the corporation's total capitalization. The transaction
complained of occurred during negotiations between Jacobson
and Yaschik relative to the former's sale of her interest to the
latter-the sale having been consummated on May 8, 1964, for
30,000 dollars. On May 1, 1964, unbeknown to the plaintiff,
Yaschik contracted with a third party for the sale of two hundred shares of Syndicate, Inc. for a purchase price of 144,000
dollars. The plaintiff's fifty shares were therefore valued at
36,000 dollars; in addition to the 6,000 dollar difference, two
acres of the original eighty-two acre tract were to be conveyed
for a nominal sum to a corporation owned by Yaschik.
The plaintiff, in her action to recover her prorata share of the
profit together with punitive damages, relied upon two theories:
(1) fraudulent concealment in breach of a fiduciary duty owed
to a fellow stockholder; (2 ) constructive representation of a false
and material element of the stock sale upon which she had a right
to rely and did rely to her detriment. The defendant, Yaschik,
demurred, asserting that: (1) neither theory was sufficient as
there was no allegation of an active perpetration of fraud upon
the plaintiff by him-his silence and failure to disclose the aforementioned arrangements relative to the stock sale was the only
wrong alleged; and (2) there was no allegation that he as an
officer and director of the corporation had gained special facts
and knowledge not accessible to the plaintiff.
The court, in sustaining the lower court's decision to overrule
the demurrer, relied upon Black v. Simpson,5 wherein the South
Carolina Supreme Court determined:
The defendant, as director and manager, was trustee not only
of the corporation, but for all the stockholders.... His duty
was to manage the corporate property for the benefit of the
stockholders; and in the performance of that duty he was
chargeable with the utmost good faith. It was a breach of
his trust to all of the stockholders to use any means to
acquire for himself the corporate property, except in the
open after giving to the stockholders, fully and candidly, all
material information he possessed as to its condition and
5. 94 S.C. 312, 77 S.E. 1023 (1913).
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value. Yet, according to the complaint, he entered upon a
scheme to control the corporation and acquire the corporate
property for his own advantage by positive concealment as
to the real condition of the corporation and the value of its
property. 6
That the defendant acted for his personal benefit to the plaintiff's detriment is reasonably evident. In upholding the trial
judge the court concluded that Mlack committed it to the position
that:
[O]fficers and directors of a corporation stand in a fiduciary
relationship to the individual stockholders and in every
instance must make a full disclosure of all relevant facts
when purchasing shares of stock from a stockholder ....

An analysis of the instant case necessitates a review of three
concepts regarding the corporate officer's duty of disclosure: the
minority rule as adopted herein; the majority concept as advanced by the defendant; and the "special facts" doctrine as
advocated by the plaintiff.
There is a conflict of authority accompanied by some confusion
regarding the application of these three concepts to the duty of
a corporate officer to disclose information relative to stock values
before purchasing a fellow stockholder's shares.
III. THm M

oiui

Ru.x, THE "SPEc

L FAcTs" DoCTINE AND

THE MINOmTY RuLE8

The majority rule rejects any fiduciary relationship between
a corporate director and/or officer and a fellow stockholder with
respect to the purchase of the shareholder's stock in the absence
of an active fraud. Since there is no fiduciary obligation on
behalf of the director or officer, he is under no duty to disclose
any information regarding the future value of the shares which
he purchases. Though he may remain silent, he cannot actively
suppress such information or intentionally misrepresent the
facts.0
6. Id. at 315, 77 S.E. at 1025.
7. Jacobson v. Yaschik, 155 S.E.2d 601, 605 (S.C. 1967).
8. See the cases discussed and cited in Annot. 7 A.L.R.3d 500 (1966) ; Annot.

84 A.L.R. 615 (1933).

9. See FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE COPRPORATIONS

§ 1168.1 (perm. ed. rev. 1965).
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The "special facts" doctrine as enunciated in Strong v. Rep/dei0 represents an exception to the majority rule. This doctrine imposes a limited fiduciary duty on the director in stockpurchase transactions with a fellow stockholder. In situations
where the director or officer gains special knowledge" which
might affect the value of the stock to be purchased, a fiduciary
relationship is created obligating the director
to disclose any and
2
all facts affecting the value of the stock.'

The minority rule carries the degree of the fiduciary relationship between director and shareholder one step further in establishing the fiduciary standing as a matter of law. The director
or officer cannot purchase stock from a fellow shareholder without first fully disclosing any information he has which might
13
indicate an appreciation in the value of the stock.
To varying degrees all three concepts concern the fiduciary
relationship. Although the premises underlying the fiduciary
relationship are not complex, attempts to apply the doctrine were
often accompanied by considerable confusion. 14 This confusion
has engendered a lack of uniformity which has aggravated the
initial dilemma.
In an effort to promote a better understanding of the fiduciary
doctrine in relation to dominant shareholders, it has been suggested that there are basically two approaches to imposing the
fiduciary duties :15

One is a direct approach by which one, attentive to the
principles of equity, looks at the relation of the dominant
shareholder to the other shareholders and concludes as a
matter of law that it is a fiduciary relation. The other is an
indirect approachby which one looks in the first instance at
the relation of the directors to shareholders and concludes
that if a shareholder dominates the corporation through his
influence over the directors he must bear an identical relation to the minority shareholders.'"
10. 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
11. Such special knowledge may include knowledge of proposed mergers,
assured sales, etc.
12. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1171
(penn. ed. rev. 1965).
13. Id. at § 11682.
14. Geller v. Transamerica Corp., 53 F. Supp. 625, 629 (D. Del. 1943).
15. Comment, The Fiduciary Relation of the Dominant Shareholder to the
Minority Shareholders, 9 HAsT. L.J. 306 (1958).
16. Id. at 307.
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The ambiguity in the application of the fiduciary doctrine has
resulted primarily from a majority of the courts adopting the
position that since the director does not share truly legalistic
relationship (trustee, agent, etc.) with the individual stockholder,
there can be no fiducial relation between the two parties.17 The
majority of the courts have adhered to this rationale which recognizes the directors as not standing in any fiducial relation to
the individual shareholders. There has been a growing trend,
however, to circumvent the harshness of the majority rule by
applying the fiduciary doctrine so as to establish a duty of
disclosure.' 8
IV. Opp CORPoRATION v. CLOSE CORPORATioN
While there is considerable disagreement among commentators
as to the exact definition of a close corporation, the following
desiderata are generally recognized: (1) The stockholders are
few; (2) Most or all of the stockholders are officers and directors; (3) Circulation of the outstanding shares is limited or restricted to the existing stockholders, or there is no readily available market for their shares; and (4) The stockholders are
generally relatives and are intimately acquainted. 19 The basic
consideration is one of determining
[H]ow to permit a small group of businessmen to obtain the
benefits of limited liability quickly and at a reasonable cost,
thus encouraging small business enterprise . . . without at

the same time exposing the public at large to the danger of
stock swindles ....

20

The defendant conceded that "[p]ersuasive reasons may be
given for applying the minority rule to officers and directors of
a large corporateorganization 'where its stock is 'widely distributed and held in comparatively small units,"21 but he maintained
that no such compelling reasons had been advanced justifying
17. Note, The Fiduciary Relationship of the Corporate Director to the In-

dividual Shareholder, 13 Wyo. L.J. 140, 142-43 (1959).
18.

FLETCUER, CYCLOPEDIA Or THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1175

(perm. ed. rev. 1965).
19. Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 500, 501 (1966).
20. Adickes, A "Closed Corporation Law" for California, 54 CALr. L. REV.
1990 (1966).
21. Brief for Defendant, Appellant-Respondent at 10, Jacobson v. Yaschik,
155 S.E.2d 601 (S.C. 1967). The defendant argues that the minority rule is for
the protection of the small shareholder who has invested in a large corporation
wvhere because of the size and complexity of the situation it is virtually
impossible for him to receive or obtain intelligent information.
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the application of the minority rule to a small, dormant corporation.22 In this respect, however, he failed to acknowledge that
In view of the intimacy among participants ...the courts
should be somewhat more inclined to impose a fiduciary duty
on shareholder-director-officers of a close corporation in
their dealings with a fellow shareholder than they are to
impose a fiduciary duty on directors, officers or sharehold23
ers in a publicly held corporation.
As mentioned previously, the majority-no fiducuary dutyrule appears to have been generally discredited in the close corporation setting as placing in jeopardy the interest of a minority
shareholder. Some of the factors underlying this increasing
unpopularity are: (1) The limited number of shareholders
enables a few stockholders to "freeze out ' 2 4 the remainder; (2)
The lack of a readily available market upon which the shares
can be traded often makes it difficult to appraise the value of a
share of stock; and (3) The intimate relationship between the
parties promotes a greater amount of confidence in and reliance
25
upon one's fellow shareholder.
It is not disputed that upon incorporation directors and officers attain certain powers and that the "majority" rules. However, the mere fact of incorporation should not be interpreted as
giving the majority shareholders license to arbitrarily exercise
their powers at the expense and frustration of the minority
shareholders.20 It is to prevent such inequitable situations from
arising that the courts impose a fiduciary duty upon the officers,
directors and majority stockholders.

V. ACCEPTANCE OF THE "FmuoIARY" RuLE
In recent years the minority or "fiduciary" rule has received
greater acceptance, and the fiduciary duty has been established
as a matter of law by cases and statutes. For example, the state
22. Id. at 10. The defendant further contends that the minority rule should
not be applied because "[e]ach stockholder had an intimate knowledge of the
sole asset, the conduct of the business [dormant], and the value of the stock
[which was only the value of the land]."
23. O'NEAL, CLOSE CoRpoRATIoNs: LAW AND PRACTICE § 8.15 (perm. ed.
1958).
24. "Freeze out" is a term used to describe an abusive action taken by majority shareholders when they use inside information or their majority to force
mnority shareholders from the corporation.

25. Annot, 7 A.L.R.3d 500, 502 (1966).
26. O'NAL, CLOSE CORPORATmIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 8.07 (perm. ed.
1958).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1967

21

South
Carolina Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 5 [1967], Art. 12
SOUTH CAROLILwA LAW REVIEW
[Vol1. 19
courts of Arizona,2 7 Colorado2 8 and Iowa2 9 have viewed precedents in their respective jurisdictions as dictating that corporate officers and directors occupy a fiduciary relation to their
fellow stockholders and must act in the utmost good faith. The
Iowa court gave some insight into the imposition of the "fiduciary" rule when it stated that "[i]t is the policy of the law to put
fiduciaries beyond the reach of temptation by making it unprofitable to yield to it."30 Deterrence appears to be one of the
main underlying reasons for applying fiduciary standing as a
matter of law.
Several jurisdictions have remedied the situation by statute. 3 '
California and New York have proposed but have failed to adopt
such legislation. The California proposal 2 applied to a closed
corporation in particular.
In addition to protection afforded by the states, the shareholder is also protected by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
which encourages and in some respects demands full disclosure.
Under this act protection has been extended to close corporations
pursuant to Rule 1OB-5, Code of Federal Regulations in those
cases where the deceptive transaction is effected "in connection
with" the use of the United States mails or means or instrumen-

talities of interstate commerce.83
In South Carolina, thirty-five years after Black, the court in
Gilbert v. McLeod Infirmary34 discussed the fiduciary duty as
follows:
Undoubtedly the directors of a corporation in the management of the corporate affairs occupy a position of extreme
trust and confidence and exercise great power for good or
bad over the corporation and its shareholders .... Toward
27. Hatch v. Emery, 1 Ariz. App. 142, 146, 400 P.2d 349, 353 (1965).

28. Hudson v. American Founders Life Ins. Co. of Denver, 151 Colo. 54, 5758, 377 P.2d 391, 393 (1962).
29. Schildberg Rock Prod. Co., Inc. v. Brooks, 258 Iowa 759, 140 N.W.2d
132 (1966).
30. Id. at 766, 140 N.W.2d at 136.
31. Several of the states which have enacted statutes which have designated
the standing between corporate officers and directors, and stockholders as that

of a fiduciary are Louisiana and North Carolina. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT.

ch. 55, § 55-35 (1965).

32. Adickes, A "Closed Corporation Law" for California, 54 CALIF. L. REV.
1990, 2019 (1966).
33. For a comprehensive discussion of federal legislation in this area see
O'NEAL, CLOSE CoRaoRATioxs: LAW AND PRAcTiCm § 8.16 (perm. ed. 1958).

34. 219 S.C. 174, 64 S.E.2d 524 (1951).
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[the corporation] and the shareholders they undoubtedly

stand in a fiduciary relation as far as corporate business is
concerned..

85

In 1963 the state legislature added the words "of the shareholder" to section 12-18.15 of the South Carolina Code. The
amended section then read as follows: "The directors and officers of a corporation shall exercise their powers and discharge
their duties in good faith with a view to the interests of the
corporation and of the shareholders ...

."-6

As evidenced by the

above cases and amendment, the South Carolina courts and
legislature are becoming more aware of the fiduciary relationship as demanding full disclosure from the corporate director
and officer as a matter of law.
VI. CONCLUsiqo

The Jacobson decision has as a matter of law imposed a fiduciary relationship upon corporate officers and directors. While
the holding of the court dealt specifically with the obligation of
full disclosure in regard to the purchasing of stock by a director
and/or officer from a fellow shareholder, it is not unlikely that
the fiduciary concept will be extended beyond this particular
type of transaction. As already discussed, some jurisdictions
using the fiduciary concept have afforded this doctrine broad,
pervasive application, to the extent that the stockholder will be
protected from practically any type of abuse arising from transactions with corporate officers and directors. There seems to be
an increasing interest in requiring full disclosure based upon the
fiduciary doctrine. The courts and legislatures of some jurisdictions are prescribing higher business standards as abuses come
to light.
In all probability the Jacobson holding will not be restricted
to close corporation transactions only. It has long been recognized that there were cogent and persuasive reasons for applying
the minority rule to widely distributed, publicly held corporations. Such considerations as the complexity of the transactions
and the shareholder's absence from the "hub" of the business
have rendered full disclosure a necessity. Now it is being realized that there are equally valid arguments for requiring an
35. Id. at 185, 64 S.E2d at 528-29.

36. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 12-18.15 (Supp. 1966).
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absolute fiduciary standing in conjunction with full disclosure
to be applied to the close corporation as well.
It is the role of wise counselors to assist in the development
of refined standards and to point out to managers .. that
good ethics are not only good business in the long run, but
also the overture to law in an evolving society. 31
EDWARD P. GummA

, JR.

37. Cary, Corporate Standardsand Legal Rules, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 408, 420

(1962).
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-MIRANDA: APPLICATION
AT RETRIALS
While their impact has not been as catastrophic as many
originally anticipated, the strict requirements for the admissibility at trial of statements obtained during custodial interrogation, as enunciated in Miranda v. Arizona,' have become a dominant consideration in the preparation and trial of every criminal
case. Perhaps the most important issue raised by Miranda concerned its retroactive application. This issue was resolved in
Johnson v. New Jersey2 where the Supreme Court ruled that
Miranda was not to be applied retroactively and would, consequently, be unavailable as grounds for appeal from decisions
rendered prior to June 13, 1966-the date of the Miranda decision. It is the objective of this article to consider another question, left unanswered by Johnson, which is being raised with
increasing frequency across the nation: Are the new standards
for determining the admissibility at trial of statements taken
during in-custody interrogation to be applied at the retrial of
cases originally tried prior to Miranda but remanded for a retrial subsequent to the effective date of Miranda?
As a constitutional prerequisite for the admissibility of statements, either exculpatory or inculpatory, given by a suspect in
the course of custodial interrogation, Miranda imposed upon the
prosecution the burden of showing that prior to beginning the
interrogation the suspect was warned that he had the right to
remain silent, that anything he said could be used against him
in a court of law, that he had the right to the presence of an
attorney at the interrogation, and that counsel would be appointed for him if he could not afford an attorney. Though
these rights can be waived by the suspect, a silent record will
not give rise to a presumption of a waiver. It is incumbent upon
the prosecution to demonstrate affirmatively that the waiver was
made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.
In Johnson a convicted murderer sought to overturn his conviction, alleging that he had been denied permission to consult
an attorney before being interrogated. Since the appeal was filed
prior to the date of the Miranda decision, it was argued on the
basis of Esoobedo v,. IllinoisO which had been decided subsequent
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
3. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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to the original conviction. The Court ruled that Escobedo and
Miranda were not to be applied retroactively and that the new
rules delineated in these cases were not to affect cases pending
on direct appeal on the respective dates of these decisions.
Two weeks after the Johnson decision the question of whether
or not to apply the Miranda standards to retrials was first raised
in State v. Shoffner,4 with the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
concluding in the affirmative. Characteristic of many subsequent cases concerning this issue, Shoffner contained a dissenting opinion. Within the month the question was decided in three
other cases on appeal being remanded for new trials, the most
notable of which was Gibson v. United States.5 In Gibson the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed
a conviction under the Dyer Act. In remanding the case for
retrial, it observed:
Appellants' alleged statements and admissions to the
Agent, must now hurdle the barriers unveiled in the recent
off-spring of Escobedo, including, Miranda v. Arizona,
Vignera v. New York, Westover v. United States and California v. Stewart .... This formidable foursome, the legitimacy of which is challenged by four members of the Supreme Court, may cause the district judge to reappraise his
previous stand on the admissibility of the challenged statements and admissions. The "guidelines" suggested by the
Chief Justice, were not available at the time of trial and we
see no reason why those principles should not be applied on
the new trial of this cause. Johnson et al. v. New Jersey...
would appear to support this view. Consequently, the district judge should have the first chance to take another look
at the problem.0
Other than its reference to Johnson, which has been referred
to as "scarcely convincing",7 the Gibson Court failed to articulate its reasons for concluding that Miranda should be applied
at the retrial-a conclusion which has been cited as dictum in
many cases on this issue. Gibson gives no hint that a contrary
interpretation might be possible. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky went so far as to say, "[i]t is certain that the principles
4. 31 Wis. 2d 412, 143 N.W2d 458 (1966).
5. 363 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1966).
6. Id. at 148.
7. People v. Worley, 227 N.E.2d 746, 749 (Ill. 1967).
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enunciated in Escobedo and in Miranda v. State of Arizona . . .
will be applicable in the event of another trial. See Johnson v.
State of New Jersey."8 Granted, the weight of authority indicates that the conclusions drawn by the above courts are correct;9 but that the matter is by no means certain is evidenced by
decisions to the contrary in Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, New
Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania.'0 The decisions from Arizona, California and Wisconsin adopting the Gibson view contain vigorous dissents. Moreover, all of the courts which have
decided this issue, either for or against the application of
Miranda at retrials, interpret Johnson as supporting their position. If the solution to this disputed issue is to be found, it
should lie within the holding and rationale of Johnson, where
the Supreme Court examines the purpose of its decision in
Miranda and discusses the criteria for deciding the question of
retroactivity.
The Court determined in Johnson: "We hold further that
Miranda applies only to cases in which the trial began after the
date of our decision one week ago."" No distinction is made
between trials and retrials. Several of the state courts attempted
to answer the question by interpreting the meaning of "trial."
In holding Miranda applicable to retrials, the Supreme Court of
California in People v. Doherty"2 interpreted "trial" in light of
that state's Penal Code which provides that "[t]he granting of
a new trial places the parties in the same position as if no trial
had been had."'13 In Jenkins v. State14 Delaware interpreted
8. Creech v. Commonwealth, 412 S.W.2d 245, 247 (Ky. 1967) (emphasis
added).
9. United States ex rel. Pierce v. Pinto, 259 F. Supp. 729 (D.N.J. 1966),
afI'd per curian, 374 F.2d 427 (3d Cir. 1967) ; Gibson v. United States, 363

F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1966) ; Government of the Virgin Islands v. Lovell, 378 F.2d
799 (3rd Cir. 1967); State v. Brock, 101 Ariz. 168, 172, 416 P.2d 601, 605

(1966) ; People v. Doherty, 429 P.2d 177, 59 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1967) ; State v.

Ruiz, 421 P.2d 305, 307 n.3 (Hawaii 1966) ; State v. McCarther, 197 Kan. 279,

286, 416 P.2d 290, 296 (1966) ; Creech v. Commonwealth, 412 S.W.2d 245, 247
(Ky. 1967) ; State v. Jackson, 270 N.C. 773, 155 S.E2d 236 (1967) ; State v.

Shoffner, 31 Wis. 2d 412, 433, 143 N.W.2d 458, 468 (1966); cf. Moorer v.
South Carolina, 368 F.2d 458, 462 (4th Cir. 1966).
10. Jenkins v. State, 230 A.2d 262 (Del. 1967) ; Sims v. State, 223 Ga. 465,
156 S.E.2d 65 (1967); People v. Worley, 227 N.E.2d 746 (Ill. 1967); People
v. LaBelle, 53 Misc. 2d 111, 277 N.Y.S.2d 847 (Rensselaer County Ct. 1967) ;
State v. Vigiliano, 50 NJ. 51, 232 A.2d 129 (1967); Commonwealth v. Brady,
1 Cr. Law Rep. 2305 (Crawford County Ct., Pa. 1967).
11. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 721 (1966).

12. 429 P.2d 177, 59 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1967).
13. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1180 (West 1967).

14. 230 A.2d 262 (Del. 1967).
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"trial" on the basis of prior decisions as supporting an opposite
result. In considering the meaning of the word as used in the
Johnson decision, the Delaware court stated, "[a]lthough de
novo, a new trial is not a new case; it is a continuation of the
original case until the judgment is final. In our opinion, Johnson refers to 'cases' the originaZ trial of which commenced after
June 13, 1966."'' Because the various jurisdictions do not have
a uniform concept of the word "trial", Johnson does not support
a definite conclusion one way or the other. This ambiguity is
aggravated by the statement in Johnson that "Miranda should
apply only to cases commenced after [the decision was] announced."'
As pointed out in the Illinois case of People v. Worley,17 "[a]
retrial is not ordinarily thought of as the commencement of a
case."' 8 Equally confusing is the statement in Johnson that
"[fluture defendants will benefit fully from our new standards ...."19 The term "future defendants" also lacks a uniform
connotation and could be construed to support either view. Further digression into the construction of the isolated phraseology
employed in Johnson would be fruitless.
The Illinois Supreme Court derives support for its contention
that Miranda is not applicable to retrials from a comparison of
the holding in Johnson with that in Linkletter v. WaZker 20 with
respect to cases pending on direct appeal. Linidetter held that
the rule announced in Mapp v. Ohio2' excluding evidence gained
as the result of an illegal search and seizure was not retroactive.
Johnson specifically refused to apply Miranda to cases pending
on direct appeal, whereas Linkletter applied Mapp to such cases.
The weakness of this argument is illustrated by a review of the
other possible explanations for the contrasting holdings.
The holding and terminology in Johnson are inconclusive with
respect to the application of Miranda to retrials. This necessitates an examination of Johnson designed to ascertain the intentions of the Court and to determine if these ends would be furthered by the application of Miranda standards to retrials. The
15. Id. at 274 (emphasis added).

16. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 733 (1966).
17. 227 N.E.2d 746 (Il. 1967).
18. Id. at 750.
19. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 732 (1966).

20. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
21. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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criteria for determining the question of retroactivity were established in Linkletter and Tehan v. Shott.2 2 In discussing the

application of the principles in these cases to the question of
whether or not Miranda was to be given retroactive effect, the
Court noted:
In the past year we have twice dealt with the problem of
retroactivity in connection with other constitutional rules of
criminal procedure. These cases establish the principle that
in criminal litigation concerning constitutional claims, "the
Court may in the interest of justice make the rule prospective ...

where the exingencies of the situation require such

an application." These cases also delineate criteria by which
such an issue may be resolved. We must look to the purpose
of our new standards governing police interrogation, the
reliance which may have been placed upon prior decisions
on the subject, and the effect on the administration of jus28
tice of a retroactive application of Escobedo and Miranda.
The primary objective of Miranda was to give full effect to
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The
application of Miranda to retrials would certainly promote this
objective. Another purpose was to increase the reliability of the
fact-finding process; and, arguably, this would be facilitated
also by applying Miranda at retrials. Those opposing this argument have a convincing answer, however.
[W]hether a constitutional rule of criminal procedure does
or does not enhance the reliability of the fact-finding proc[While
ess at trial is necessarily a matter of degree ....
Escobedo and Miranda guard against the possibility of unreliable statements in every instance of in-custody interrogation, they encompass situations in which the danger is not
necessarily as great as when the accused is subjected to overt
24
and obvious coercion.
Since the reliability of the statements was not a problem of such
concern as to warrant retroactive application, it is not essential
to a fair retrial that the new standards be applied. With regard to
a voluntariness claim, a host of cases decided prior to Escobedo,
are available to defendants in cases decided prior to Miranda.
22. 382 U.S. 406 (1966).
23. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 726-27 (1966).
24. Id. at 728-30.
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The second criterion the Court agreed to consider was the
reliance placed on its prior decisions. Johnson recognized that
"[1]aw enforcement agencies fairly relied on these prior cases,
now no longer binding, in obtaining incriminating statements
during the intervening years preceding Escobedo and Miranda."125 Those contesting Miranda's application at retrials cite this
criterion as one of their principle arguments. Nevertheless, "the
court did not accord decisive importance to the reliance of police
officers on prior decisions in planning admissible custodial interrogations." 26 Nor was any consideration given to the possibility of applying Miranda only to statements taken after its
effective date. Even in a case tried for the first time subsequent
to June 13, 1966, statements taken prior to that date would be
inadmissible unless they met the new standards. This strongly
indicates that a different rule would not be established for retrials. It is indeed unfortunate that many statements obtained
through diligent efforts on the part of conscientious law enforcement officers would thereby be rendered inadmissible in the
prosecution of cases the outcome of which might well rest upon
their admission or exclusion. But, it would be almost humorous
to suggest that any more than lip service was given this element
of reliance; to the contrary, the recent decisions in the criminal
procedure area are apparently motivated by distrust of law
enforcement officers whom the Court characterizes as poor
guardians of constitutional rights.
The reliance the Court was primarily concerned with was that
which trial judges had placed on previously recognized standards in admitting statements the admission of which would constitute reversible error should Miranda be given retroactive
effect. This consideration focuses attention on the third and
controlling factor in the Court's decision-the effect such a ruling would have on the administration of justice.
[Rletroactive application . . . would seriously disrupt the

administration of our criminal laws. It would require the
retrial or release of numerous prisoners found guilty by
trustworthy evidence in conformity with previously 'an27
nounced constitutional standards.
25. Id. at 731.

26. People v. Doherty, 429 P.2d 177, 183, 59 Cal. Rptr. 857, 863 (1967).
27. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 731 (1966).
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The proliferation of appeals and retrials of incarcerated
persons engendered by such a ruling would, in the Court's
own words, "impose an unjustifiable burden"2 8 on the now already over-docketed courts. This sound argument against retroactivity does not lend itself to solution of the question of whether
or not to apply Miranda at retrials, because these cases must be
retried anyway. No additional load is placed on the court
dockets by applying or not applying Miranda at retrials. It
should be noted that the courts of Delaware and Illinois adopt a
contrary view and suggest that forcing the retrial of cases without admitting statements upon which the prosecution based its
case is just such an "unjustifiable burden" as Johnson seeks to
avoid. But if the Supreme Court felt that way, it would have
allowed statements taken prior to Miranda to be admitted without insisting upon compliance with the new standards.
In summary, bare language in Johnson gives no conclusive
support to either side of the argument; but an examination of
the Court's intentions is more helpful. Applying Miranda at
retrials would protect the fifth amendment right against selfincrimination-the main function of Miranda. The "reliance on
prior decisions" factor would have little influence on the Court,
except as it placed a burden on the administration of justice by
permitting or requiring additional trials. But, the cases discussed here must be retried anyway, and, therefore, this consideration does not affect the application of the new standards at
retrial. Finally, Johnson is concerned with the date the statements are offered as evidence at trial, not with the date the
statements were obtained. Statements violative of Miranda
standards taken prior to June 13, 1966, could not be admitted
at a trial held after that date. The same reasoning should apply
to retrials; the effectuation of standards designed to protect the
fifth amendment right against self-incrimination is deemed more
important than preventing some undeserving criminal from
availing himself of the arbitrary results as would be occasioned
by the application of Miranda to retrials. 29 A majority of the
28. Id. at 733.

29. An example illustrating how the application of Miranda to retrials would

produce arbitrary results is included in the concurring opinion in People v.

Doherty:
Assume the case of defendants A and B, arrested in March 1966 and both
tried in May 1966, both of whom gave inculpatory statements, without

which convictions could not have been assured, to authorities who scrupulously complied with Dorado but whose admonitions fell short of Miranda
directives. Assume there is no error in the trial of defendant A but that
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cases, including of those decided by the federal circuit courts on
this point, support the conclusion that Miranda should be applied
to retrials, but a strong minority are convinced otherwise. This
leads to the likelihood that the Supreme Court will be called
upon to decide the issue, and indications are it will require
Miranda to be applied at the retrial of cases originally decided
prior to the effective date of Miranda. If the Court so decides,
those persons convicted in retrials in jurisdictions where the
Miranda standards were not applied will have grounds for appeal, possibly leading to yet another trial-exactly what Johnson
seeks to avoid. However, in the unlikely event the Court does
decide to the contrary, in those jurisdictions adhering to the
majority view and applying Miranda to retrials, the prosecution
would be precluded from appealing the erroneous exclusion of
statements violative of Miranda standards, except in cases where
such appeal is permitted by statute.8 0 Nor would the states be
required to change their procedure for reason that Johnson expressly permits the states to employ stricter standards than those
adopted by the Supreme Court. 1
I-uN-Y B.

RIcHADSON,

JR.

B's conviction is reversed because of errors wholly unrelated to constitutional provisions. When B's retrial takes place after June 13, 1966, the
majority would require his statement to be excluded, and as a result B
would go free whereas A suffers a penalty for the identical crime detected
under identical circumstances.
429 P.2d 177, 187, 59 Cal. Rptr. 857, 867-68 (1967).
30. 5 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 2251 (1957).
In the absence of a statute clearly conferring the right, as a general rule,
the state or the United States cannot appeal or bring error proceedings
from a judgment in favor of the defendant in a criminal case.
Fifth amendment double jeopardy prohibition does not apply to states via the
fourteenth amendment due process clause so as to prevent appeal by the prosecution where state statute allows the state to appeal in criminal cases. Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). See Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100
(1904).
31. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 731 (1966).
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DAMAGES-HUSBAND AND WIFE, PARENT AND CHILD
-PUNIIVE DAMAGES DISALLOWED IN HUSBAND'S
CAUSE OF ACTION ARISING OUT OF INJURIES
TO HIS WIFE AND MINOR CHILD*
Hughey 'v. Ausborn' presented only one clearly defined issue-whether a husband could recover punitive damages for injury
to his wife and minor child; but the court's rationale in this
case suggests a changing trend in the area of punitive damages
in South Carolina. The decision places in question the basic
theory and policy considerations upon which the award of punitive damages seems to rest in South Carolina and casts doubt
upon the validity and consistency of the rules regarding punitive
damages which have evolved both through court decision and
legislative enactment.
In Hughey the plaintiff brought suit seeking recovery of
medical expenses, damages for loss of consortium and punitive
damages resulting from injuries which his wife and minor child
had sustained in an automobile accident. In previous actions
against the same defendant, the wife and child had recovered
actual and punitive damages for their personal injuries. At the
close of testimony in the present suit, the defendant moved for
a directed verdict as to punitive damages. This motion was
overruled and the jury instructed to find both actual and punitive damages. On appeal the Supreme Court of South Carolina
reversed as to punitive damages, holding that punitive damages
are not an element of a husband's cause of action to recover for
loss of consortium and medical expenses arising out of injuries
sustained by his wife and minor child.
I. INT ODUOTION

Most jurisdictions recognize that when a defendant's conduct
has been willful or reckless, it is within the province of the
jury to make a separate award in excess of compensation,
variously labeled punitive damages, exemplary damages, vindictive damages and even "smart money ;,,2but the courts are not
in accord as to the policy ends to be effected thereby. Some
courts have adhered to the more conventional position, reflected
* Hughey v. Ausborn, 154 S.E.2d 839 (S.C. 1967).

1. 154 S.E.2d 839 (S.C. 1967).

2. See generally 25 CJ.S. Damages § 117(1) (1966).
871
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in the earlier South Carolina cases,3 that damages in excess of
compensation are awarded in civil actions entirely as a means of
punishment, intended to deter the defendant and others like him
from committing similar acts in the future. 4 Other jurisdictions
regard punitive damages primarily as compensation for injuries
not susceptible of accurate measurement, such as mental anguish
or distress, insult, indignity and fright, and only incidentally as
a means of deterrence. 5 Although it is clear that mental anguish
is compensated solely through an award of actual damages in
South Carolina, there is language in some of the South Carolina
cases which suggests that punitive damages are not entirely
separable in theory from actual damages and have a truly compensatory aspect. For example, the court has said:
Exemplary or punitive damages go to the plaintiff, not as
a fine or penalty for a public wrong, but in vindication of
a private right which has been willfully invaded; and indeed, it may be said that such damages in a measure compensate or satisfy for the willfulness with which the private
right was invaded, but in addition thereto operating as a
deterring punishment to the wrong-doer, and as a warning
to others.7
We have also recognized that such damages are awarded not
only as punishment and as a deterrent to the commission of
like offenses, but as vindication of a private right ...
Therefore such damages involve a compensatory aspect
8
which we have long recognized.
Although such a compensatory theory might provide some
justification for the windfall allowed a plaintiff through an
award of punitive damages, the majority of the court in Hughey
3. E.g., Chanellor v. Vauglm, 2 Bay 416 (S.C. 1802) wherein a motion for
new trial on the ground that damages were awarded in excess of compensation
was denied. It was the court's opinion that "[tjhe peace and good order of the
community depended very much on making proper examples of such disorderly
and turbulent men as the defendant appeared to be." See also Spikes v. English,

4 Strob. 34 (S.C. 1849).

4. See generally 22 Am.

JUR.

2d Damages § 237 (1965).

5,See generally Annot, 16 A.L.R. 771, 793-97 (1922), supplemented, 123
A.L.R. 1115, 1121-1122 (1939).
6,Lanford v. West Oakwood Cemetery Addition, Inc., 223 S.C. 350, 75
S.E.2d 865 (1953) ; Shuler v. Heitley, 209 S.C. 198, 39 S.E.2d 360 (1946).
7, Watts v. South Bound R.R., 60 S.C. 67, 73, 38 S.E. 240, 242 (1901),
quoted with approval it Rogers v. Florence Printing Co., 233 S.C. 567, 573,

106 S.E.2d 258, 261 (1958).
8. Hicks v. Herring, 246 S.C. 429, 437, 144 S.E.2d 151, 155 (1965).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol19/iss5/12

34

1967]

et al.: COMMENTS
COMMNTS

seems to have minimized, if not rejected, the concept of compensation as a basis for allowing recovery of punitive damages.
This aspect of the Htughey rationale is discussed below.
II. Tue HUGHEY RAnoALE

A. Cases Distinguished.
Cases cited for the proposition that the husband should be
allowed to recover punitive damages were distinguished from
the present fact situation. In Fennel v. Littlejobn the plaintiff
brought a criminal conversation suit based on the extra-marital
relationship between his wife and the defendant. A judgment
for actual and punitive damages was affirmed on appeal. Fennel was distinguished from the present case on the grounds that
the defendant's conduct there did not create a cause of action in
the wife, but only in the husband; thus, duplicate recovery of
punitive damages, such as was involved in Hughey, was not in
issue.
In Webb v. Southern Railway'° the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant's agents wrongfully persuaded her minor child to
engage in dangerous railroad work as result of which the minor
was injured. A prior suit brought by the child against the same
defendant based entirely on his injury had been defeated upon a
finding of contributory negligence. The mother, however, was
successful in her suit, and a judgment for actual and punitive
damages was affirmed on appeal. The court found it significant
that the child's suit and the mother's suit in Webb were entirely
separate-one based on personal injury and one based on enticement of a minor child. The defendant's alleged negligence in
injuring the child, which formed the basis of the child's suit,
need not have been proved in the mother's suit; 11 and the child's
contributory negligence, which defeated his recovery, could not
be pleaded as a defense in the mother's suit.' 2 In the present
case, although the husband's, wife's and child's suits have been
regarded as separate causes of action for some purposes,' 3 they
9. 240 S.C. 189, 125 S.E.2d 408 (1962).
10. 104 S.C. 89, 88 S.E. 297 (1916).
11. Although the existence of the child's injury as a proximate result of the
defendant's conduct may have increased the damages awarded to the mother,
her cause of action was original and based entirely on wrongful enticement of
a minor child, not on the minor's injury.
12. Webb v. Southern Ry., 104 S.C. 89, 94, 88 S.E. 297, 299 (1916).
13. E.g., Priester v. Southern Ry., 151 S.C. 433, 149 S.E. 226 (1929); Hall
v. Waters, 132 S.C. 117, 128 S.E. 860 (1925).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1967

35

South
Carolina
Law Review,
Iss. 5 [1967], Art. 12
Souzu
CAROLiNA
LAWVol.
RE19,
Vmw

[Vol. 19

each arose out of the same wrong committed by the defendant;
and the contributory negligence of the wife or child, if proved
in the husband's action, would serve to defeat his recovery.' 4 The
majority of the court found Webb distinguishable on these
grounds.
B. Actual Damages.

Although with regard to punitive damages the specific question presented in Hughey was one of novel impression, the basic
principles concerning recovery of actual damages by the husband, wife and child have long been established. As will be seen
later, the majority of the court in Hughey found that these principles provided support for their decision concerning recovery of
punitive damages by the husband, wife and child.
When a minor child is injured through the fault of another, a
cause of action arises on behalf of the child through his guardian
ad Zitem to recover for pain and suffering and impairment of
future earning capacity; a separate cause of action arises in
favor of the child's father for loss of services and medical expenses."' The father's cause of action derives from the legal
obligation imposed upon him to provide support and furnish
necessaries for his minor child. 16 This legal obligation comprehends payment of the child's medical expenses; thus, medical
expenses are not an element of the child's suit.' 7

The Married Woman's Property Act,' 8 which made it possible
for a wife to sue in her own name, did not abridge the common
law rules with respect to the husband's cause of action for medical expenses and loss of consortium which arise when his wife is
injured as a result of a third party's negligence.' 9 As with the
14. 27 Am. JUR. Husband and Wife § 507 (1940) ; 39 Am. Jup. Parent and

Child §§ 81, 85 (1942).

15. See generally 67 C.J.S. Parent and Child §§ 40, 41 (1950).

16. Campbell v. Campbell, 200 S.C. 67, 20 S.E2d 237 (1942).

See also

Harris v. Leslie, 195 S.C. 526, 12 S.E.2d 538 (1940); Workman v. Workman,
174 S.C. 490, 178 S.E. 121 (1935); S.C. CoDE ANN. § 20-303 (Supp. 1966);

67 C.J.S. Parentand Child § 15 (1950).

17. Medlin v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 403 (D.S.C. 1963); Bridges v.

Joanna Cotton Mill, 214 S.C. 319, 52 S.E.2d 406 (1949); Tucker v. Buffalo
Cotton Mills, 76 S.C. 539, 57 S.E. 626 (1907).
18. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-216 (1962).
19. Vernon v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 218 S.C. 402, 63 S.E.2d 53 (1951);
Cook v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 196 S.C. 230, 241-44, 13 S.E.2d 1, 6-7

(1941); Priester v. Southern Ry., 151 S.C. 433, 149 S.E. 226 (1929) ; Coulter
v. Hermitage Cotton Mills, 112 S.C. 93, 98 S.E. 846 (1919). But see Hollifield

v. Keller, 238 S.C. 584, 121 S.E.2d 213 (1961); Brazell v. Camden, 238 S.C.

580 121 S.E2d 221 (1961). See also Sheffield v. American Indem. Co., 245
S.d. 389, 140 S.E.2d 787 (1965); Sossamon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 243
S.C. 552, 135 S.E.2d 87 (1964).
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father's cause of action for injury to his child, the husband's
cause of action for injury to his wife derives from his legal
obligation of support 20 and is separate from the wife's cause of
21
action for loss of earnings and pain and suffering.
0. Analogy to Actual Damages.
The following extract from the concurring opinion of Justice
Brailsford sets out essentially the grounds upon which the
Hughey decision was based:
[T]he courts have been astute to separate the elements of
damage sustained by the injured child or wife from those
accruing to the father or husband. This is important to
assure that each element of damage is awarded to the person
justly entitled thereto and to protect the defendant from
being mulct twice for the same loss. This salutary policy
has been consistently followed by the courts with respect to
compensatory damages. It seems reasonable and just that it
should be applied to punitive damages, which, as pointed out
22
in the dissent, have a compensatory aspect.
As the above extract illustrates, the court relied at least partially on the basic principles concerning the allocation of actual
damages between the husband, wife and child in deciding that
the husband could not recover punitive damages notwithstanding
the defendant's reckless or willful conduct. The particular elements of actual damage caused by the defendant's conduct are
so apportioned among the various parties that each recovers only
those elements which represent his own loss. In the same sense
that a sum for medical expenses is awarded exclusively to the
father in compensation of his unique loss, it was the court's
opinion that punitive damages should be awarded exclusively to
the wife and child, who were the parties more directly injured.
Even though these principles were consistent with the majority
opinion, they were not conclusive as to the issue in question.
While actual damages could be divided among the various plaintiffs to compensate each unique loss, punitive damages, since
20. Cook v. Cook, 213 S.C. 247, 49 S.E2d 9 (1948) ; Holloway v. Holloway,

203 S.C. 339, 27 S.E2d 457 (1943) ; State v. Bagwell, 125 S.C. 401, 118 S.E.
767 (1923). See also S.C. CoDE Axx. § 20-204 (1962).
21. Brown v. Finger, 240 S.C. 102, 124 S.E.2d 781 (1962). Cf. S.C. CODE
AxN. § 20-204 (1962).
22. Hughey v. Ausborn, 154 S.E2d 839, 843 (S.C. 1967)

opinion).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1967

(concurring

37

876

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 5 [1967], Art. 12
[Vol. 19
SouTH CAROLuNA LAw REviW

awarded in excess of compensation, are not susceptible to a logical division on the same basis. An award to compensate pain
and suffering, for example, was given exclusively to the wife
and child because the husband did not personally sustain this
element of damage. The award of punitive damages, on the
other hand, is not based on any unique compensable loss
sustained. Even nominal compensatory damages will support a
cause of action for punitive damages. 23 Although the husband
has
was not physically injured, recovery of punitive damages
24
never been restricted to cases involving physical injury.
Secondly, the above extract suggests that punitive damages
have a truly compensatory aspect 2 5 and for this reason should be
apportioned, as are compensatory damages, so as to avoid duplicate recovery for the same loss. If this proposition were conclusive, however, recovery of punitive damages by both the wife and
child in their separate suits against the defendant would represent an anomalous duplicate recovery. In Hughey the jury found
that the defendant's conduct had been reckless, willful, or wanton, and the actual damage sustained by the husband in the
form of medical expenses was at least as definite and immediate
as the actual damage sustained by the wife and child. Thus, all
the requisites of a cause of action for punitive damages which
were present in the wife's or child's suit were also present in the
husband's suit.
D. The Punishment Rationale.
Since the analogy to the recovery of actual damages based
upon a compensatory theory of punitive damages did not provide
a conclusive solution to the problem at hand, Hughey may be
taken as a clarification of the court's viewpoint with respect to
the nature and purpose of punitive damages in general. The
decision in Hughey actually turned on the third argument inherent in Justice Brailsford's concurring opinion-that the defendant should not be "mulct twice" for the same wrong. In refusing
to emphasize a compensatory aspect of punitive damages over
the more traditional punishment concept, the court was probably
motivated by the obvious proposition that in future cases it
23. Hinson v. A.T. Sistare Construction Co., 236 S.C. 125, 113 S.E.2d 341

(1960).

24. Id. at 125, 113 S.E.2d at 341; Charles v. Texas Co., 199 S.C. 156, 18
S.E.2d 719 (1942).
25. See cases cited note 7, 8 supra.
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would be difficult, if not impossible, to limit the number of times
a defendant could be mulct with punitive damages when sued in
separate actions by several plaintiffs. 26 If punitive damages are
regarded as a kind of compensation for the willful invasion of
a private right, there is no reason why the husband should not
have been "compensated" equally with his wife and child 27 as

discussed above. But if punitive damages are regarded as a
means of deterrence, then the policy reasons against successive
punishment for the same wrong would require that punitive
damages not be assessed again in the husband's action. It was
not double compensation, but double punishment for the same
wrong, which motivated the Hughey limitation on recovery of
punitive damages.
26. See Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1173,
1194-95 (1931). Professor Morris illustrated the problem of double punishment by reference to the two Luther v. Shaw cases, 157 Wis. 231, 147 N.W. 17
(1914) and 157 Wis. 234, 147 N.W. 18 (1914) in which one plaintiff recovered
punitive damages in a breach of promise suit and the plaintiff's father subsequently recovered punitive damages against the same defendant in a seduction
suit. As a solution to this problem it was suggested that the jury should be
apprised of the amount of punitive damages assessed against the defendant in
the first action or that the two actions should be consolidated. Professor Morris
recognized that the problem increases in complexity as the number of plaintiffs
increases. The parade of horrors thus foreshadowed became a reality in Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967), where several
hundred suits were pending against the defendant drug manufacturer. The
court, speaking through Judge Friendly, denied punitive damages altogether,
rejecting the notion that punitive damages sufficient to deter should be awarded
the first few plaintiffs to sue:
Neither does it seem either fair or practicable to limit punitive recoveries
to an indeterminate number of first-comers, leaving it to some unascertained court to cry, "Hold, enough," in the hope that others would follow.
While jurisprudes might comprehend why Toole in California should
walk off with $250,000 more than a compensatory recovery and Roginsky
in the Southern District of New York and Mrs. Ostopowitz in Westchester County with $100,000, most laymen and some judges would have
some difficulty in understanding why presumably equally worthy plaintiffs in the other 75 cases before Judge Croake or elsewhere in the country
should get less or none. And, whatever the right result may be in strict
theory, we think it somewhat unrealistic to expect a judge, say in New
Mexico, to tell a jury that their fellow townsman should get very little
by way of punitive damages because Toole in California and Roginsky
and Mrs. Ostopowitz in New York had stripped that cupboard bare, even
assuming the defendant would want such a charge, and still more unrealistic to expect that the jury would follow such an instruction or that, if
they dida't, the judge would reduce the award below what had become
the going rate.
Id. at 839-40.
27. See the dissenting opinion of Bussey, Aj., wherein the following question
was propounded: "Can it be soundly argued that a man is entitled to recover
p nitive damages when his rights as to his horse, his cow or his wagon are
willfully violated, but may have no vindication of his willfully and wantonly
violated rights as to his wife or his child?" Hughey v. Ausborn, 154 S.E.2d
839, 844 (S.C. 1967). The answer would seem to be that a man's horse, cow,
or wagon cannot recover punitive damages in separate actions against the
defendant.
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III. PuNiTiv DAMAGEs

AND CRUI,

PU1WISHM

NT

Hughey is not the first case in this jurisdiction involving punitive damages in which the issue of double punishment was
before the court. With respect to the relationship between the
assessment of punitive damages and punishment under the criminal law, the court previously decided that not only was the violation of a criminal statute sufficient foundation for an action
to recover punitive damages, 28 but also that evidence of prior
criminal prosecution and fine was not admissible in mitigation:
"[T]he indictment and civil action are prosecuted for the same
trespass, but not by the same parties. One is an offense against
society, the other a private wrong." 2 9
Most courts in extending this rationale have concluded that
the constitutional protection against double jeopardy did not
require a choice between punitive damages and criminal indictment even though the same wrongful act of the defendant
formed the basis of both actions.3 0 It has been said that the compensatory theory of punitive damages originated as a means of
avoiding this constitutional issue.31
A minority of jurisdictions have adopted the opposite view
that punitive damages cannot be awarded for a willful or reckless tort which is also punishable as a crime, since the defendant
should not be punished twice for the same wrong8 2 Certain
other jurisdictions, which do not consider criminal punishment
or fine as a bar to recovery of punitive damages, do allow evidence of prior criminal sanction in mitigation of punitive
33
damages.
The Hughey rationale would seem to be more in keeping with
the minority rule. If a defendant should not have to pay punitive damages because such damages had already been assessed in
a prior action based on the same tortious act, it would seem to
28. Saint Charles Mercantile Co. v. Armour & Co., 156 S.C. 397, 153 S.E.
473 (1930).
29. Wolff v. Cohen, 8 Rich. L. 144, 151 (S.C. 1855), quoted udth approval in
Edwards v. Wessinger, 65 S.C. 161, 165, 43 S.C. 518, 519 (1903).

30. See generally Annot., 16 A.L.R. 771, 798-08 (1922), supplemented, 123
A.L.R. 1115, 1122 (1939).
31. Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, "435 (5th Cir.
1962).
32. E.g., Shufakiss v. Duray, 85 Ind. App. 426, 154 N.E. 289 (1926). See

generally Annot., 16 A.L.R. 771, 801-03 (1922), supplemented, 123 A.L.R.

1115, 1122 (1939).

33. E.g., Saunders v.Gilbert, 156 N.C.463, 72 S.E. 610 (1911). See generally

16 A.L.R.771, 803-808 (1922).
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follow that evidence of a previously imposed criminal sanction
should at least be admissible in mitigation of punitive damages
in a civil action arising out of the same tort. The South Carolina
cases disallowing evidence of a prior criminal sanction in mitigation seem to be doubtful precedent in view of the better reasoning
in the Hughey decision.
IV. MA1sTM AIM SERVANT

In many jurisdictions, before a master can be made to respond
in punitive damages for the willful torts of his servant, the
plaintiff must prove that the master participated in, ratified, or
authorized the wrongful act.8

4

In South Carolina, however, the

master's liability for punitive damages rests entirely upon the
doctrine of respondeat superior, and neither ratification, authorization nor participation need be proved. 5 It would seem that
this rule must be grounded in the compensatory principle, which
was rejected in Hughey, for punitive damages are assessed
against the master notwithstanding his innocence. Hughey seems
to stand for the proposition that a defendant should not be punished successively in separate suits for the same willful or reckless act. It would seem inconsistent that a master should be
punished through an assessment of punitive damages even
though he committed no willful or reckless act. The master may
have been negligent in hiring or failing properly to supervise
his servants; but the common law of torts has never seen fit to
assess punitive damages as a deterrent to mere negligence.
Furthermore, in Johnson v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad 6
the court, in overruling a prior decision,3 7 held that punitive
damages could be assessed in separate sums against the master
and servant. Oddly enough, the majority opinion in this case was
based upon the well established rule that the jury may consider
evidence of the defendant's wealth in determining the amount of
punitive damages necessary to deter, and this rule is, itself, based
upon the punishment concept of punitive damages: against a
wealthy defendant, a larger assessment of punitive damages is
8
necessary in order to effect specific deterrence. 8
34. See generally 25 C.J.S. Damages § 125(4) (1966).
35. Hooper v. Hutto, 160 S.C. 404, 158 S.E. 726 (1931); Taber v. Seaboard

Airline Ry., 81. S.C. 317, 62 S.E. 311 (1908) ; Reeves v. Southern Ry., 68 S.C.
89, 46 S.E. 543 (1904).
36. 142 S.C. 125, 140 S.E. 443 (1927).
37. Jenkins v. Southern Ry., 130 S.C. 180, 125 S.E. 912 (1924).
38. Calder v. Southern Ry., 89 S.C. 287, 302-303, 71 S.E. 841, 846 (1911).
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The Johnson rationale was stated as follows:
[O]ne defendant could not justly be held liable in punitive
damages measured by the wealth of some other defendant.
Either it must be placed within the province of the jury to
find separate verdicts, or the rule permitting consideration
of evidence of wealth of the defendants must go out of the
issue of punitive damages. There is no middle ground between these two propositions.3 9
It would seem, however, that since the master's liability rests
entirely on the wrongful act of his servant under the fiction of

respondeat supe?ior, the master should be liable only in the
amount for which his servant alone would be liable, and only
the servant's wealth need be admissible. Since the master is held
vicariously liable notwithstanding his lack of participation in
the wrongful act, under a compensatory theory of punitive damages, the rule permitting consideration of the defendant's wealth,
which is based upon the punishment concept, should be abandoned. Since the innocent master is not in need of deterrence,
there is no reason to allow a separate verdict of punitive damages
against the master based upon his wealth.
The better rule would seem to be that offered in the dissenting
opinion in Johnson that punitive damages should not be apportionable, nor evidence of the master's wealth admissible, unless
the master has participated in, authorized or ratified the tortious
act so as to merit punishment himself. 40 Indeed, the punishment
concept of punitive damages implicit in the Hughey rationale
would seem to suggest that the master should not be liable at all
for punitive damages absent participation, authorization or
ratification.
V.

LIABILITY INSURANCE

In addition to the master-servant cases the present insurance

law in this state suggests a compensatory theory of punitive
damages contrary to the Hughey rationale. The automobile insurance statutes in South Carolina, as amended in 1964, make it
clear that a liability policy must provide coverage for punitive
damages, 41 thus rendering any question of public policy in this
39. Johnson v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 142 S.C. 125, 159-60, 140 S.E. 443,
454 (1927).
40. Id. at 168, 140 S.E. at 457 (dissenting opinion).

41. S.C. CODE Aim. § 46-750.31(4) (Supp. 1966).
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area moot. In a case which arose before the amendment, the
court construed a liability policy as sufficiently broad to cover
42
punitive damages without discussing the issue of public policy.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, did reach
this issue in interpreting Florida decisions and held that an
insurance policy which in terms covered punitive damages contravened public policy by shifting liability from the wrongdoer
to the insurance company :4
Where a person is able to insure himself against punishment
he gains a freedom of misconduct inconsistent with the
establishment of sanctions against such misconduct. It is
not disputed that insurance against criminal fines or penalties would be void as violative of public policy. The same
public policy should invalidate any contract of insurance
against the civil punishment that punitive damages repre44
sent.
Such damages do not compensate the plaintiff for his injury, since compensatory damages already have made the
punishing the
plaintiff whole. And there is no point in
45
wrong.
no
done
has
it
company;
insurance
Moreover, the requirement that an insurance company pay
punitive damages is inconsistent with the rule allowing the defendant's wealth to be admissible as a factor in assessment.
There is no reason to allow evidence of the defendant's wealth to
determine the amount of punitive damages necessary to deter
because the insurance company, not the defendant, must pay
these damages. Obviously, the insurance company's wealth cannot be admitted into evidence even though Johnson v. Atlantic
Coast Line Railroad4 6 indicates that the jury may consider the
wealth of the master, a kind of insurer himself under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
Finally, it has been said that the purpose of the award of
punitive damages is to enforce deterrence generally so that "all
42. Carroway v. Johnson, 245 S.C. 200, 139 S.E.2d 908 (1965). See also
Pennsylvania Thresherman & Farmers' Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Thornton, 244
F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1957). In Laird v. Nationzide Ins. Co., 243 S.C. 388, 134
S.E.2d 206 (1964), the court decided that the uninsured motorist statute prior
to amendment, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 46-750.11 and 46-750.14-.18 (1962), did not
require coverage; therefore, the court did not reach the issue of public policy.
43. Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962).
44. Id. at 440.

45. Id.
46. 142 S.C. 125, 140 S.E. 443 (1927).
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the people may look to the law of their land to defend them
from wrongful invasions of both their personal and property
rights." 47 It would seem that the present insurance law in South
Carolina would impede rather than further this policy, for the
wrongdoer is allowed to escape, the insurance company which
has done no wrong is punished directly, and in the end society
as a whole, which the court would protect, is punished indirectly by way of higher insurance rates. 48
VI. CoNCLSoION

Hughey seems to represent a reversal in the trend reflected in
the criminal punishment cases, the master-servant cases, and the
present insurance law and reflects a return to the more conventional punishment concept of punitive damages. If punitive
damages are awarded as a means of punishment and deterrence,
a limitation should be set, wherever practicable, on the number
of times a defendant can be punished for the same tortious act.
Although the limitation set in Hughey is somewhat arbitrary-both the wife and child were permitted to recover punitive damages from the defendant for the same wrongful act 49-it

was

nonetheless a realistic compromise. Perhaps the Hughey rule will
be applied by analogy in other situations where several plaintiffs
seek recovery of punitive damages against the same defendant for
the same wrong committed. And perhaps Hughey will provide
the basis for a reconsideration by the court of the distinction
between actual damages, punitive damages, and criminal punishment, as well as a reconsideration of the nature and purpose
of punitive damages in general.
ROBERT

M. EIA

47. Id. at 139, 140 S.E. at 447.
48. Accord, Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 440-41
(5th Cir. 1962).
49. Compare quoted material note 26 supra.
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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS AND EMINENT DOMAINRIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL TO RECOVER FOR DAMAGE
TO PRIVATE PROPERTY OCCASIONED BY ALLEGED
NEGLIGENCE OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATION
IN WIDENING STREET*
The familiar constitutional guaranty that private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation' has
been softening the effects of the power of eminent domain in
this country for many years. It is in substance found in the
constitutions of most, if not all, of the states, and yet, in spite of
the long tenure and universality of this principle, it is still in
many respeds a difficult one for courts to interpret and apply.2
In the recent case of Kline v. City of Co~umbia,3 the South
Carolina Supreme Court examined the law as it has developed
in this state, particularly with respect to that conduct which
constitutes a taking of property under the state constitution.4
The plaintiffs in this action were the owners of a building
located on Huger Street in Columbia, South Carolina. In November of 1962 the city of Columbia began excavating a street
in the vicinity of the building in order to relocate a fire hydrant
and prepare for a widening of the street at that point. The complaint charged that during this excavation, employees of the
city negligently ruptured a gas line running from the street to
the building, thereby allowing gas to seep into the building
where it came in contact with a gas heater and ignited. The
resulting explosion and fire severely damaged the building and
its contents. The complaint further charged the city's employees
with negligence in failing promptly to inform the South Carolina Electric and Gas Company, its co-defendant, of the ruptured
line and alleged negligence on the part of the company in failing
promptly to shut off the gas when notified.
The plaintiffs maintained that the damage caused by the city
constituted a taking of their property under Article I, section 17
of the South Carolina Constitution for which they should be
* Kline v. City of Columbia, 155 S.E.2d 597 (S.C. 1967).

1. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
2. 18 Am. Juim. Eninent Domain § 3 (1938).

3. 155 S.E.2d 597 (S.C. 1967).
4. S.C. CONsT. art 1, § 17. "Private property shall not be taken for private
use without the consent of the owner, nor for public use without just compensation being first made therefor."
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compensated and, in addition, that the facts would sustain a
cause of action under section 47-70 of the South Carolina Code. 5
The city moved to strike those paragraphs of the complaint
asserting its negligent failure to notify the gas company and
demurred to the complaint on the ground that it did not state a
cause of action under either the constitution or the code. Both
the motion to strike and the demurrer were overruled by the
lower court.
Before examining the supreme court's analysis of the constitutional issue, some attention should be directed to previous decisions concerning the application of section 17. This section is in
itself the basis for recovery by an injured party; it does not
depend on enabling legislation for its authority.6 It applies to
action by the state, its agents 7 or municipal corporations." The
South Carolina Supreme Court has been very liberal in its interpretation of what is meant by the term "taking". Unlike many
jurisdictions, the law of this state acknowledges no distinction
between "taking" and the damaging of property where such
damage results from the maintenance of a public work.9
Further, it has been held that this damage need not be physical in nature nor of substantial degree; section 17 applies as
well to cases where only the normal use or enjoyment of the
property has been impaired.10
To sustain its contention that the facts as alleged in the Kline
case were not compatible with the above interpretations, the city
relied wholly upon Collins V. City of Greenville.11 There an
employee of the city of Greenville attempted to unclog a sewer
pipe by forcing the collected debris farther down the pipe. This
debris later collected at another point in the sewage system
5. S.C. CoD ANN. § 47-70 (1962).
Any person who shall receive bodily injury or damages in his person or
property through a defect in any street, causeway, bridge or public way
or by reason of a defect or mismanagement of anything under control of
the corporation within the limits of any city or town may recover in an
action against such city or town the amount of actual damages sustained

by him....

6. Moseley v. South Carolina State Highway Dep't, 236 S.C. 499, 115

S.E.2d 172 (1960).

7. University of South Carolina v. Mehlman, 245 S.C. 180, 139 S.E.2d 771

(1964).
8. Smith v. City of Greenville, 229 S.C. 252, 92 S.E.2d 639 (1956).
9. Moss v. South Carolina State Highway Dep't, 223 S.C. 282, 75 S.E.2d
462 (1953).
10. Webb v. Greenwood County, 229 S.C. 267, 92 S.E.2d 688 (1956).
11. 233 S.C. 506, 105 S.E.2d 704 (1958).
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causing water to overflow the fixtures in the plaintiff's building. Rejecting the contention that the resulting damage to the
floors and carpets of the building amounted to a taking of property, the court stated in part:
[T]here was no taking for public use which is permanent or
of a permanent nature, and growing out of positive act of
the appellant. The complaint reveals that there was a single
isolated instance which resulted in damage to the respondent.
There was no degree of permanent taking in the constitutional sense nor was there continuity of such over a period
of time. 12
The court in Kline conceded some similarity between the two
cases and seemed to agree fully with the above reasoning. However, it determined that since the city of Columbia was, at the
time of the accident, engaged in a definite project-widening
the street as a permanent improvement for the public use-a
cause of action under the constitution could be sustained. The
appellant's case was therefore distinguished largely on its facts.
Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of sustaining the
action is presented by comparing the present case to those dealing with the damaging of property by water. A long line of
South Carolina cases bear witness to the proposition that when,
in the course of constructing or improving a public work, water
is diverted onto privately owned land, the owner thereof is entitled to just compensation.' 3 This is true whether the inundation is permanent or occasional so long as it is accompanied by
property damage.' 4 Emphasizing the similarity between these
two situations, the court observed that: "No logical reason is
suggested why the invasion of one's property with a highly inflammable substance, such as gas, should be considered any less
a taking of property than an invasion by water.",
This approach to the question was further bolstered by the
citation of several decisions involving air pollution. In Kneece
v. City of Columbia'6 the plaintiff was allowed to recover for
12. Id. at 512, 105 S.E.2d at 708.
13. Milhous v. South Carolina State Highway Dep't, 194 S.C. 33, 8 S.E.2d
852 (1940) ; Chick Springs Water Co. v. South Carolina State Highway Dep't,
159 S.C. 481, 157 S.E. 842 (1930); Faust v. Richland County, 117 S.C. 251,
109 S.E. 151 (1921).
14. Lindsey v. City of Greenville, 247 S.C. 232, 146 S.E.2d 863 (1966).
15. Kline v. City of Columbia, 155 S.E.2d 597, 599 (S.C. 1967).
16. 128 S.C. 375, 123 S.E. 100 (1924).
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damages to his premises caused by disagreeable odors emitting
from a nearby incinerator belonging to the city. In an earlier
case1 7 an action was sustained when fumes from a slaughter
house interferred with the normal use and enjoyment of adjacent
lands.
On the basis of the facts alleged in the plaintiff's complaint
and their similarity with the cases mentioned above, the court
ruled against the city by concluding that a cause of action under
section 17 of the constitution had been sufficiently established.
The nature of the city's appeal required the court to determine
whether a case had also been established under section 47-70 of

the South Carolina Code. Normally, such a determination would
not have been necessary once the constitutional question had been
decided, but here the city also moved to strike those paragraphs
of the complaint charging it with negligence. Allegations of
negligence are inconsistent with a demand for relief under the
constitution,1 8 but they are essential to a complaint based on the
code.' 0 Accordingly, unless the plaintiffs were also allowed to
proceed under the code, the motion to strike would have to be
20
sustained.
Section 47-70 is consistent with the general rule that a municipality is liable for damages resulting from a failure to keep its
streets and roadways in a reasonably safe condition. 21 The
statute, however, must be strictly construed, and one seeking to
recover under it must clearly establish that he belongs to the
class being protected. 22 A number of cases have limited its protection to those persons using the street for travel at the time of
injury. 23 The application of these decisions to the facts in the
Kline case proved difficult-so much so, in fact, that the court
was unable to reach a clear cut decision. The city maintained
that the plaintiffs were not entitled to the protection of the

statute because they were not using the street when the injury
occurred. Certainly, in the ordinary sense of the term "use" this
is true; but the plaintiffs contended that even though they were
17. Derrick v. City of Columbia, 122 S.C. 29, 114 S.E. 857 (1922).
18. Rice Hope Plantation v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Authority, 216 S.C.
500, 59 S.E.2d 132 (1950).
19. Gilchrist v. City of Charleston, 115 S.C. 367, 105 S.E. 741 (1921).
20. Kline v. City of Columbia, 155 S.E.2d 597, 600 (S.C. 1967).
21. Dolan v. City of Camden, 233 S.C. 1, 103 S.E.2d 328 (1958).
22. Singleton v. City of Sumter, 180 S.C. 536, 186 S.E. 535 (1936).
23. See Hicks v. City of Columbia, 225 S.C. 553, 83 S.E.2d 199 (1954);
Athanas v. City of Spartanburg, 196 S.C. 19, 12 S.E.2d 39 (1940).
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not traveling on the street at the time, they were nevertheless
making legitimate use of it. That is, at the time of the damage
they were using the street for the purpose of transporting fuel
through pipes located beneath that portion of the street which
is generally traveled. In addition they claimed ownership of the
underlying fee. Their argument is not without support. The
24
case of Leppard v. Central Carolina Telephone Company,
decided in 1944, established that the use of a street to transport
fuel, power, or telephone messages does not place an additional
burden upon the easement. There are other cases which suggest
that a street may properly be "used" for activities other than
25
travel.
The precise question involved has never been before our
supreme court. The cases suggested by the parties here afforded
support only through their language and dictum, and persuasive
arguments were offered by both sides. There was, in effect, not
much for the court to base its decision on. In addition, the
question would have to be decided in ruling on a demurrer involving facts alleged but not proved at trial. Realizing this and
cognizant that any decision reached would have a profound
effect on future cases brought under the statute, the court left
the question open. It declared only that the plaintiffs had the
right to prove, if they could, a cause of action under the statute
at trial.
Thus, a determination that could have made this case instrumental in extending the statutory protection was avoided. As a
result, the law is still not clear with respect to just who is protected. In holding the plaintiffs entitled to recover under the
constitution, the court seemed to be applying an established doctrine to a new set of facts rather than extending the fundamental concept. Nevertheless, this decision may illustrate a
propensity on the part of the court to grant some means of relief
to those persons injured by municipal corporations which might
yet result in the liberalization of the law in this area.
C. E. McDoxALD, JR.

24. 205 S.C. 1, 30 S.E. 2d 755 (1944).
25. See Gowan v. Greenville County, 193 S.C. 327, 8 S.E.2d 509 (1940);

Reeves v. City of Easley, 167 S.C. 231, 166 S.E. 120 (1932).
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